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Carbon Capture at Boundary Dam 3 still an underperforming failure

April 30, 2024
David Schlissel and Mark Kalegha

Key Findings

More than CAD1 billion were spent retrofitting the Boundary Dam 3 coal plant to add carbon capture technology, and the project is still capturing far less than the 90% originally promised.

Boundary Dam 3’s long-term CO2 capture rate through the end of 2023 was just 57% (that is, 63% of 90%).

Despite this poor performance, CCS proponents still make false claims about how well carbon capture has worked at Boundary Dam.

Canadians should not be proud of the money and resources wasted on CCS, and should be especially concerned about the billions of dollars now earmarked for additional CCS investments.

More than CAD1 billion were spent retrofitting the Boundary Dam 3 (BD3) coal plant in Saskatchewan to add carbon capture technology. After nine years, the project has a consistent history of capturing far less than the 90% promised when the project was built—and all the carbon dioxide (CO2) captured at the plant is used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) that injects captured CO2 into the ground to extract more oil.

In April 2021, IEEFA published a short analysis responding to project owner SaskPower’s claim that capturing 4 million metric tons of CO2 at Boundary Dam 3 was a milestone “to be proud of.” The coal plant did capture its four millionth metric ton of CO2 in March 2021, but it reached that mark two years later than had originally been forecast—highlighting the project’s inability to sustain the 90% capture rate promised by SaskPower and other proponents.

The project’s performance has not improved since.

SaskPower data shows that the project had captured less than 5.8 million metric tons of CO2 as of the end of 2023. This is just 63% of the 9.2 million tons it would have captured if it had actually hit the 1 million tons per year (or 90%) mark that SaskPower initially claimed. This means that BD3’s long-term CO2 capture rate through the end of 2023 was 57% (that is, 63% of 90%).

As can be seen in Figure 1, BD3 has never achieved the stated goal of capturing 1 million metric tons of CO2 each year.

Forecase verse capture
Figure 1: Boundary Dam 3 Annual CO2 Capture from January 2015 to December 2023

Sources:  SaskPower monthly and quarterly Boundary Dam 3 Status Updates.

Despite this poor performance, CCS proponents still make false claims about how well carbon capture has worked at Boundary Dam. For example, Eadbhard Pernot, carbon capture policy manager for the Boston-based Clean Air Task Force, has claimed that “the project has consistently performed at its capacity. And I think that’s really something Canada should be proud of.” Figure 1 shows that statement is patently false.

To be considered a success, a carbon capture project must capture all or almost all CO2 produced by the facility (power or industrial plant) to which it is attached and must do so for decades. SaskPower’s own CO2 capture data shows that Boundary Dam’s overall capture rate during its nine years in service has been closer to 50% than 90%.

A paper by SaskPower and the International CCS Knowledge Centre first acknowledged in October 2022 that BD3 had not sustained its planned 90% capture rate since 2015. It then provided the following insights into BD3’s failure.

First, a key reason for BD3’s underperformance is that the carbon capture portion (CCP) of the plant has been available to capture CO2 during only about 80% of the hours that the power plant has been in operation. During the remaining 20% of the hours the plant has been available, its flue gases containing the CO2 have been emitted directly into the atmosphere—with no CO2 being captured.

But even when the CCP has worked, not all the plant’s flue gases and the CO2 they contain are processed by the carbon capture portion. According to the Knowledge Centre’s paper, the entire facility typically operates with only an average of 73% of the full flue gas going to the CCP. The remaining 27% of the flue gases and their CO2 have been released into the atmosphere.

In summary, the BD3’s CCP operates only about 80% of the hours that the power plant is running. And even when running, it only processes an average of 73% of the flue gases from the plant. Given these circumstances, it is no surprise that BD3’s actual long-term CO2 capture rate has been about 57%—not 90%.

Beyond the plant’s poor performance, there also are serious environmental concerns regarding the use of the captured CO2 that is sold for EOR activities.

The U.S. government has estimated that injecting a metric ton of CO2 for EOR can produce between two and three barrels of additional oil, depending on the underground geology of the oil field and the difficulty of extracting the oil. It also is estimated that burning a barrel of oil or using it as a petrochemical feedstock releases almost half a tonne of CO2 into the atmosphere. This means that if injecting a metric ton of CO2 for EOR conservatively produces just 2¼ barrels of oil, more than a tonne of CO2 will be emitted when the oil is used, assuming all CO2 injected into the ground for EOR actually stays there.

The bottom line is that Canada’s billion-dollar bet on carbon capture at Boundary Dam 3 has been a bust. The technology has badly underperformed, capturing only roughly 57% of the plant’s CO2 emissions in its nine years of operation and never hitting the annual 90% capture target. In addition, since the CO2 that is captured is being used for EOR activities, it is likely that the capture and reuse of the CO2 has led to an increase in global CO2 emissions.

Canadians should not be proud of the money and resources wasted on carbon capture, and they should be especially concerned about the billions of dollars now earmarked for additional carbon capture investments. Carbon capture is not a solution to the world’s climate crisis, especially when coupled with enhanced oil recovery.

David Schlissel

David Schlissel is an IEEFA analyst with 50 years of experience as an economic and technical consultant on energy and environmental issues. 

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Mark Kalegha

Mark Kalegha is an Energy Finance Analyst tasked with covering the oil and gas industry in Canada with a focus on project valuation, capital budgeting and capital structure analysis for upstream, midstream and downstream entities.

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